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reader response
Reader Response is a feature of the Journal purposed to provide
an informal forum for comment and response to articles appearing in
the Journal. Letters directed to Reader Response should be triplespaced and should not exceed 1500 words in length. Items received
will be edited only for grammar and punctuation. Letters should be
sent to:
Reader Response
Natural Resources Journal
University of New Mexico School of Law
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87131
In the October 1981 issue of the Natural Resources Journal' I asserted
that Professor McDonald's April 1981 examination of the crude oil windfall profit tax was incorrect. He viewed the tax as a leftward shift of the
domestic supply curve, thereby reducing domestic production and increasing imports of crude oil. I pointed out that the static framework was
inappropriate: oil is an exhaustible resource and should be analyzed in
an intertemporal framework. My dynamic analysis demonstrated that the
windfall profit tax could either decrease or increase domestic production,
and that an appropriately chosen tax rate would not distort domestic
production at all.
Professor McDonald replied3 that my analysis was irrelevant to the
domestic oil industry, due to the existing regulatory system which constrains producers from responding to the tax in a profit maximizing manner.
I agree that the prorationing and MER (maximum efficient rate) restrictions do constrain the production decisions of domestic oil producers.
But this consideration does not invalidate my general conclusions and
certainly does not support McDonald's analysis. There are several reasons
for this:
(1) The regulatory policies do not remove all flexibility from domestic oil producers. Some wells are exempt from the regulations
and production from regulated wells depends upon well depth, among

other factors. Since producers have some control over well depth,
they also can exercise some control, albeit constrained, over the
regulated production rates.
1. 21 Natural Resources Journal 683 (1981).
2. Natural Resources Journal 332 (1981).
3. Natural Resources Journal 690 (1981).
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(2) Even if output from each well is totally constrained, total
domestic production can be varied through either the abandonment
decision or through new well development. This flexibility means
that the time path of aggregate extraction can be altered, even if
individual well production cannot.
(3) If (1) and (2) were not true, then McDonald's assertion that
"In the absence of unitization the individual operator has no choice
but to produce at capacity . . . or at the regulated rate, regardless
of the profit that might be gained by altering the time-distribution of
extraction," would be correct. But, this would make my analysis as
well as McDonald's irrelevant. For, if individual producers cannot
alter production, then the tax must have a neutral allocative effect.
In conclusion, the regulatory constraints cited by Professor McDonald
only serve to constrain the response of domestic producers to the windfall
profit tax. The constraints may alter the size but will not alter the direction
of the response, e.g., if the net present value of profits would be increased
by increased current extraction in the absence of regulation, then these
constraints will not lead to decreased extraction. My conclusion that an
appropriately chosen tax rate will not alter extraction stands in spite of
the regulatory constraints. And, these constraints in no way make
McDonald's static analysis more appropriate than my dynamic analysis.
Dale E. Lehman
Assistant Professor of Economics
University of Colorado, Boulder

April 1982]

READER RESPONSE

In my earlier reply to Professor Lehman's original comment I concentrated on the practical inability of regulated oil operators to change, in
the short run, the time-distribution of extraction from existing reservoirs
in response to a windfall profits tax. This seemed to be the quickest way
to dispose of an analysis which assumes such an ability. Professor Lehman
now recognizes regulatory constraints on oil operators' responses to profit
opportunities, but argues that the constraints are not very restrictive in
the long run in which abandonment and new development are variables.
He further argues that the constraints may change the degree of response
but not the direction. He believes his method of analysis is accordingly
upheld.
Professor Lehman's present appeal to the long run points up the majorand, I think, fatal-weakness of his approach for present purposes. His
model represents a firm with a single deposit of a fixed quantity of oil,
all of which will be ultimately recovered. He contemplates two production
periods corresponding to the "present" and the "future" and he asks the
question, How would the allocation of extraction between these two
periods be affected by the imposition of a windfall profits tax? The change
in the rate of extraction that interests him is that which occurs in the
present. (There is always an equal and opposite change in future, due to
the fixed recoverable stock.) Most importantly, there is no long run in
the sense that the stock being allocated can be increased or decreased
through exploration or abandonment. There is no long-run marginal cost
function to be affected by the tax in question.
Professor Lehman cannot have it both ways: a long run for purposes
of allocative flexibility, but none for exploration to alter the fixed stock
assumption. I believe that he over-estimates even long-run allocative
flexibility, but more importantly I believe that the long-run response of
domestic exploration to the windfall profits tax is crucial to the question
of incidence and effects. Professor Lehman must admit that even within
his framework the tax reduces the prospective profitability of potential
oil land. It therefore must shift the long-run (domestic) supply curve to
the left, increasing imports and decreasing rents, given an OPEC-determined world price. There is no way that Professor Lehman's model can
capture this effect. His approach is ill-suited to the problem at hand.
What of feed-back effects from the long run to the short run? If the
United States were self-sufficient in oil, reduced exploration would raise
expected future prices .and induce a shift in production from present to
future. But the country is not self-sufficient, and imports are freely available at the world price, determined independently of the volume of exploration in the United States. Reduced exploration does not indirectly
shift production from present to future, but imports gradually increase to
substitute for domestic production.

278

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

(Vol. 22

I conclude that my approach is more appropriate to the problem
at
hand and that it correctly identifies the incidence and effects of
the windfall
profits tax.
Stephen L. McDonald
Professor of Economics
The University of Texas at Austin

